Political factions in the Verkhovna Rada
Factions rise dominance from the late 1990s but remain institutionally weak
In her book, Sarah Whitmore outlines the constitutive role of the Rada in the formation of the post-Soviet Ukrainian state, and the slow process of its institutionalisation in a wider political context in the course of the 1990s and early 2000s. By institutionalisation, she means the creation and observation of procedural norms that enhance organisational coherence and autonomy.
In particular, Whitmore details the emergence of parliamentary standing committees and political factions—which are central to the investigation of this chapter—as the main organisational subdivisions for the allocation of parliamentary work. During this period, the parliamentary committees, dealing with the preparation, review and implementation of specialist legislation, were able to enhance authority as their expertise grew, as they became more representative of the composition of parliament, as well as locations for legislative debate. Meanwhile, by 2003, parliamentary factions had “assumed prime position in structuring and organising the Verkhovna Rada…were the dominant force inside parliament influencing deputies’ voting decisions and articulated alternative policy proposals” (Whitmore, 2004, p 185).
Despite their predominant position in the Rada after 1998, however, Whitmore concludes that the institutionalisation of the faction system occurred patchily and in spurts, so that factions “remained fluid and mutable units, unable to co-operate beyond ad hoc agreements” (Whitmore, 2004, p 185). The continuing institutional weakness of the Rada was shown most tellingly by the routine violation of the legislature’s own rules, alongside the survival of “customs” of operational behaviour outside of this formal framework--in short, through the survival of informal politics. This, in turn, has hindered the ability of the Rada as a whole to act independently of the executive branch of government and to hold it to account, she argues.
In her book, Sarah Whitmore outlines the constitutive role of the Rada in the formation of the post-Soviet Ukrainian state, and the slow process of its institutionalisation in a wider political context in the course of the 1990s and early 2000s. By institutionalisation, she means the creation and observation of procedural norms that enhance organisational coherence and autonomy.
In particular, Whitmore details the emergence of parliamentary standing committees and political factions—which are central to the investigation of this chapter—as the main organisational subdivisions for the allocation of parliamentary work. During this period, the parliamentary committees, dealing with the preparation, review and implementation of specialist legislation, were able to enhance authority as their expertise grew, as they became more representative of the composition of parliament, as well as locations for legislative debate. Meanwhile, by 2003, parliamentary factions had “assumed prime position in structuring and organising the Verkhovna Rada…were the dominant force inside parliament influencing deputies’ voting decisions and articulated alternative policy proposals” (Whitmore, 2004, p 185).
Despite their predominant position in the Rada after 1998, however, Whitmore concludes that the institutionalisation of the faction system occurred patchily and in spurts, so that factions “remained fluid and mutable units, unable to co-operate beyond ad hoc agreements” (Whitmore, 2004, p 185). The continuing institutional weakness of the Rada was shown most tellingly by the routine violation of the legislature’s own rules, alongside the survival of “customs” of operational behaviour outside of this formal framework--in short, through the survival of informal politics. This, in turn, has hindered the ability of the Rada as a whole to act independently of the executive branch of government and to hold it to account, she argues.
What are parliamentary factions?
Blocs, parties, factions and deputy groups are among the terms used to refer to formal political groupings operating in the Verkhovna Rada. Most authors implicitly agree that these are different kinds of organisation, going from the most to the least encompassing. Precisely how they differ, however, is harder to pin down.
For instance, the Rada's official procedural rules mention parliamentary factions and groups as the main organising units for the activity of people’s deputies, rather than political parties. This is indicated by the stipulation that a political party may form only one faction in the legislature (Article 58.2). Even though parliamentary factions and groups are treated slightly differently in the document, deputy groups have the same rights as factions, and there is no attempt to distinguish between them in terms of the functions they perform.
Tentatively, we might deduce a possible distinction between the two, with factions assumed to be based more around political criteria and deputy groups more on deputies' shared interest in a specific policy area (of security policy or budget issues, for example). The testimony of the heads of two such deputy goups, Martynov and B, seem to suggest as much when they answer in response to a journalist's questions that…
This is more or less in line with the definition of a faction offered by Whitmore as a politically-based association of deputies, which strictly should be organised around a party, but in practice need not be (Whitmore, 2004, p. 49-50).
In local usage, the dividing line between the different categories appears somewhat fluid. So, for example, according to the official website of the Rada, the leading parliamentary parties of the seventh and eighth convocations (eg the Party of Regions and the Petro Poroshenko Bloc/PPB) are listed as factions, whereas others, smaller and of more recent creation, are listed as groups (eg Economic Development, which was transformed into Renaissance after the 2014 election).
Weakness of the Ukrainian party system
One way of understanding the predominance of the factional system in the Ukrainian legislature is through a grasp of the persistent weakness of the country’s political party system.
For instance, the Rada's official procedural rules mention parliamentary factions and groups as the main organising units for the activity of people’s deputies, rather than political parties. This is indicated by the stipulation that a political party may form only one faction in the legislature (Article 58.2). Even though parliamentary factions and groups are treated slightly differently in the document, deputy groups have the same rights as factions, and there is no attempt to distinguish between them in terms of the functions they perform.
Tentatively, we might deduce a possible distinction between the two, with factions assumed to be based more around political criteria and deputy groups more on deputies' shared interest in a specific policy area (of security policy or budget issues, for example). The testimony of the heads of two such deputy goups, Martynov and B, seem to suggest as much when they answer in response to a journalist's questions that…
This is more or less in line with the definition of a faction offered by Whitmore as a politically-based association of deputies, which strictly should be organised around a party, but in practice need not be (Whitmore, 2004, p. 49-50).
In local usage, the dividing line between the different categories appears somewhat fluid. So, for example, according to the official website of the Rada, the leading parliamentary parties of the seventh and eighth convocations (eg the Party of Regions and the Petro Poroshenko Bloc/PPB) are listed as factions, whereas others, smaller and of more recent creation, are listed as groups (eg Economic Development, which was transformed into Renaissance after the 2014 election).
Weakness of the Ukrainian party system
One way of understanding the predominance of the factional system in the Ukrainian legislature is through a grasp of the persistent weakness of the country’s political party system.
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