Belarus in revolt


  • Remarkable features of Belarus revolt incl: i) decentralisation in Minsk & country; ii) immediate resort of the authorities to extreme, large-scale violence, unprecedented even for Belarus; spontaneous self-organisation & unity of disparate social groups.
  • 2/14 Most striking is concertinaed sequence of “post-ignition” events: from rigged result to the onset of regime defections (mostly low level so far) in less than a week. Last Saturday, the regime appeared impregnable; today, it looks dazed & shaken.
  • To paraphrase Bertolt Brecht badly, from memory: & after 12 years, the 1,000-year regime was swept away.
  • Could still go pear-shaped: Luka regime could lash out again, or play some trick to divide opposition & deal with them one by one. “Dialogue” could give regime time to regroup & rethink strategy.
  • But so far it most looks like a "democratising" revolution rather than Colour or Maidan—perhaps most similar to Solidarity in Poland or Czech Velvet? Belarus’s main anti-Soviet action ¼ century late, just as Maidan at the start seemed a bit of a late 1848.
  • In revolutionary events, usually is a build-up of preconditions, a sort of gunpowder recipe, that makes situation potentially unstable (eg recent episodes of state violence, problems with govt finances leading to economic precartity, as after 2014 with “parasite” law).

  • This is then ignited by a current short-term event: in this case, callous covid pronouncements & blatant electoral falsification, igniting unprecedented upsurge in society wide opposition, with events unwinding in recognisable sequence: onset of state breakdown.
  • Success depends on: i) regime defections, from outer layers in: ordinary police, mid-level local & central officials who do not want to flee/ end in jail: best-case ending is declaration of army neutrality; upper echelons defect; boss & key henchpeople flee or are caught.
  • Opposition unity, which means organisation, or what steps practically to achieve key demands, + anticipation of what regime & foreign powers might do: needs skilled, decisive leadership, articulating uniting vision of a better future: otherwise, democratising rev drift.
  • No concerted foreign backing of the incumbent.
  • Under Luka, elite coherence aided by his control of Rus energy rents, which suits Rus as control mechanism. Will Kremlin accept govt that does not operate in this way? If not, where does the money come from to plug the BoP gap built in to Belarus economy? For what policies?
  • That’s the start, cos revolutions are not just regime removal: positive outcomes depend on long process of changing institutions, ie generally followed habits & rules.
  • Then means rapid development of full range of immediate & longer-term political & economic policies necessary to decide the kind of society & polity & economy you want to have: this is the hard part, when opposition coalitions can start to crack. See point 9.
  • There are precedents for peaceful handover of power from violent authoritarian regimes: eg apartheid South Africa.

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