Russia-Ukraine: Putin declares martial law in “annexed” Ukrainian regions, Oct 2022
Towards the end of October, Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president, signed a degree declaring martial law in the four regions of Ukraine (Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson) that were annexed illegally by Russia in late September.
At first glance, it is hard to see what practical difference this makes, since, in effect, the parts of Ukrainian regions still held by Russia are already under military rule, while in Ukrainian-held Ukraine, martial law has been in operation since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of late February.
However, this is one of a series of ad hoc responses by the Russian leadership to some recent adverse developments, including an ongoing Ukrainian offensive in Kherson, reportedly prompting the imminent withdrawal of Russian forces back across the Dnipro River; as well as the domestic political and economic fallout from a mismanaged and unpopular military mobilisation campaign. The earlier snap “annexation” of further Ukrainian territories was itself an about-turn on previously announced policy, in response to a successful Ukrainian counter-offensive in Kharkiv region. In mid-October, an open vote in the UN reaffirmed these territories as belonging to Ukraine, by a large margin, of 143 countries for, and five against (including Russia), with 35 abstentions.
As well as perhaps aiming to reassert the “Russianness” of these four regions for the benefit of a domestic audience, one explanation proposed for President Putin’s announcement of martial law is that it is designed to facilitate the pre-announced “evacuation” of civilians from Kherson city back into Russian-controlled territory. Another is that it aims to tighten Russia’s own borders, following the large-scale flight of Russians abroad to avoid the military draft.
On this last point, Mark Galeotti, a specialist of Russian security issues, draws attention to a second decree, signed at the same time, but relating to Russia itself, which has so far garnered less attention in the Western press. This he describes as “a declaration of variegated martial law” heightening security provisions everywhere, more strictly in areas bordering in the warzone, but with some “emergency” legislation now in effect across Russia as a whole. While the enactment of security legislation can come in response to genuine emergencies threating a national polity, it is also frequently associated with attempts by governments to justify, and so legitimise, their governing role.
In this context, the formal introduction of martial law in newly annexed areas of Ukraine may be a way of gradually normalising stricter security measures in Russia itself—perhaps to pre-empt unrest, perhaps to aid mobilisation—rather than implying much of political importance to Ukraine, suggesting attempt to guard against unrest at home.
At first glance, it is hard to see what practical difference this makes, since, in effect, the parts of Ukrainian regions still held by Russia are already under military rule, while in Ukrainian-held Ukraine, martial law has been in operation since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of late February.
However, this is one of a series of ad hoc responses by the Russian leadership to some recent adverse developments, including an ongoing Ukrainian offensive in Kherson, reportedly prompting the imminent withdrawal of Russian forces back across the Dnipro River; as well as the domestic political and economic fallout from a mismanaged and unpopular military mobilisation campaign. The earlier snap “annexation” of further Ukrainian territories was itself an about-turn on previously announced policy, in response to a successful Ukrainian counter-offensive in Kharkiv region. In mid-October, an open vote in the UN reaffirmed these territories as belonging to Ukraine, by a large margin, of 143 countries for, and five against (including Russia), with 35 abstentions.
As well as perhaps aiming to reassert the “Russianness” of these four regions for the benefit of a domestic audience, one explanation proposed for President Putin’s announcement of martial law is that it is designed to facilitate the pre-announced “evacuation” of civilians from Kherson city back into Russian-controlled territory. Another is that it aims to tighten Russia’s own borders, following the large-scale flight of Russians abroad to avoid the military draft.
On this last point, Mark Galeotti, a specialist of Russian security issues, draws attention to a second decree, signed at the same time, but relating to Russia itself, which has so far garnered less attention in the Western press. This he describes as “a declaration of variegated martial law” heightening security provisions everywhere, more strictly in areas bordering in the warzone, but with some “emergency” legislation now in effect across Russia as a whole. While the enactment of security legislation can come in response to genuine emergencies threating a national polity, it is also frequently associated with attempts by governments to justify, and so legitimise, their governing role.
In this context, the formal introduction of martial law in newly annexed areas of Ukraine may be a way of gradually normalising stricter security measures in Russia itself—perhaps to pre-empt unrest, perhaps to aid mobilisation—rather than implying much of political importance to Ukraine, suggesting attempt to guard against unrest at home.
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