Ukraine: Displaced return home—but for how long? Oct 2022
Around 6m Ukrainians displaced by the ongoing war with Russia had returned home, according to a survey by UN’s International Organisation for Immigration (IMO) published in mid-October. Of these, most had returned from the places within Ukraine they had fled to earlier in the war. Around 1.2m of them, however, or 22% of the total, had come back from abroad.
According to sociological surveys, those who returned from abroad have done so for a range of reasons, including family disruption (since men of military age are not allowed to leave the country), depletion of savings, or a desire to take part in the country’s struggles at a crucial juncture in its history.
In October, the total number of Ukrainians registered as refugees in Europe reached 7.65m, according to UNHCR, the UN’s refugee agency, with many going to Poland (1.4m) and Germany (almost 1m). There are, moreover, 2.85m “registered Ukrainian refugees” in Russia, subsuming both voluntarily and involuntary arrivals. Those bussed out of Russian-controlled Donbas just ahead of the February invasion might be regarded among the first group, and those directed into Russia by way of “filtration camps”, designed to remove “pro-Ukrainian” elements from areas of Ukraine newly controlled by Russian forces, among the second.
Along with the repair and replacement of the productive capital and infrastructure damaged or destroyed in the war—which is likely to be funded through some form of internationally-backed Marshall Plan—the ability to “re-attract” Ukrainian refugees is one of the central issues affecting the country’s prospects for post-war recovery and reconstruction, in terms of the quantity and quality of the labour force (since Ukrainian refugees tend to be better educated, on average), as well as the size of the post-war consumer market (since a larger market is likely to be more attractive to investors).
From this perspective, the return home of the displaced in large numbers is a positive development. Whether this trend continues or is reversed, however, depends both on the course of the war—that is, whether military events continue to develop in Ukraine’s favour, as in recent months—and its duration, since the longer refugees remain abroad, the more likely they are to put down roots.
In this regard, it should be noted, the IMO’s assessment was made before a recent switch in Russian tactics towards aerial attacks on civilian infrastructure. As a result, according to Ukrainian officials, 30-40% of Ukraine’s electric power stations have been hit, and up to half of its thermal-generation capacity, leading to rolling blackouts in cities across Ukraine, and to public appeals to economise on energy use. On October 25th, Iryna Vereshchuk, the reintegration minister, advised Ukrainians living abroad to delay any planned return to the country until after winter. The pace of return could also be affected by the economic fallout from the war more broadly, should high energy prices and the prospect of recession accelerate “refugee fatigue” among host populations, encouraging some Ukrainians to leave.
Well before the current war with Russia, population decline in Ukraine was among the steepest in any of the post-socialist countries of eastern Europe. Alongside a high death toll, especially among young men, the failure to attract back Ukrainians in sufficient numbers from abroad with a reconstruction plan that aims to produce good jobs and affordable housing, for example, would probably raise the question of attracting migrants from elsewhere, first from the former Soviet countries, and then perhaps from further afield, in order to sustain long-term growth potential.
According to sociological surveys, those who returned from abroad have done so for a range of reasons, including family disruption (since men of military age are not allowed to leave the country), depletion of savings, or a desire to take part in the country’s struggles at a crucial juncture in its history.
In October, the total number of Ukrainians registered as refugees in Europe reached 7.65m, according to UNHCR, the UN’s refugee agency, with many going to Poland (1.4m) and Germany (almost 1m). There are, moreover, 2.85m “registered Ukrainian refugees” in Russia, subsuming both voluntarily and involuntary arrivals. Those bussed out of Russian-controlled Donbas just ahead of the February invasion might be regarded among the first group, and those directed into Russia by way of “filtration camps”, designed to remove “pro-Ukrainian” elements from areas of Ukraine newly controlled by Russian forces, among the second.
Along with the repair and replacement of the productive capital and infrastructure damaged or destroyed in the war—which is likely to be funded through some form of internationally-backed Marshall Plan—the ability to “re-attract” Ukrainian refugees is one of the central issues affecting the country’s prospects for post-war recovery and reconstruction, in terms of the quantity and quality of the labour force (since Ukrainian refugees tend to be better educated, on average), as well as the size of the post-war consumer market (since a larger market is likely to be more attractive to investors).
From this perspective, the return home of the displaced in large numbers is a positive development. Whether this trend continues or is reversed, however, depends both on the course of the war—that is, whether military events continue to develop in Ukraine’s favour, as in recent months—and its duration, since the longer refugees remain abroad, the more likely they are to put down roots.
In this regard, it should be noted, the IMO’s assessment was made before a recent switch in Russian tactics towards aerial attacks on civilian infrastructure. As a result, according to Ukrainian officials, 30-40% of Ukraine’s electric power stations have been hit, and up to half of its thermal-generation capacity, leading to rolling blackouts in cities across Ukraine, and to public appeals to economise on energy use. On October 25th, Iryna Vereshchuk, the reintegration minister, advised Ukrainians living abroad to delay any planned return to the country until after winter. The pace of return could also be affected by the economic fallout from the war more broadly, should high energy prices and the prospect of recession accelerate “refugee fatigue” among host populations, encouraging some Ukrainians to leave.
Well before the current war with Russia, population decline in Ukraine was among the steepest in any of the post-socialist countries of eastern Europe. Alongside a high death toll, especially among young men, the failure to attract back Ukrainians in sufficient numbers from abroad with a reconstruction plan that aims to produce good jobs and affordable housing, for example, would probably raise the question of attracting migrants from elsewhere, first from the former Soviet countries, and then perhaps from further afield, in order to sustain long-term growth potential.
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